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THE ROLE OF NATURAL LAW IN
THE LEGAL DECISIONS OF THE
GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC
The concept of natural law, understood in its broadest sense as a supra-
positive claim upon positive justice, has a special significance for Germany.
For it is a basic fact about German jurisprudence that it is not primarily de-
termined by traditional elements, such as those that play so large a role in
England, even in the judicial process. Instead, German legal thinking tends to
conceive of law and justice as a logical system.
This tendency as such is neither good nor bad, but is a simple fact or, better,
an intellectual attitude. It does, however, carry with it certain advantages,
as well as perils. Thinking primarily in terms of a system makes it possible to
make a fresh start at any given moment by merely altering the specific (material)
content or, perhaps, the point of departure - something that cannot be done
on short notice within the framework of a jurisprudence determined by a deeply
ingrained tradition. Whether this freedom for spontaneous initiative is good
or bad depends upon whether the initiative taken is itself good or bad. Thus,
from the point of view of legal thinking, the important question is whether the
actual legal system, as it is enforced, bears a moral character or not.
I. PERIOD PRIOR TO THE BONN CONSTITUTION
The systematic and systematizing tendency in German legal thought happened
to come to fruition, unfortunately, in an epoch when German thinking in gen-
eral was irresistibly drawn towards materialism - the epoch least suited to
visualizing and comprehending the higher (suprapositive) legal orders. To be
sure, the very idea of thinking in terms of system has already introduced a
revolutionary element in the ease with which a new approach may be selected
without regard for any binding precedent. Theoretically, however, it would be
possible to take tradition itself as the starting point of the system, using the
system, as it were, as the means of unfolding and developing what is implicit in
the tradition. This actually happened during the Middle Ages, when the
Scholastics elaborated the spiritual and thereby the legal foundations of the Holy
Roman Empire into a system, while yet keeping the classic Christian tradition
in mind as their point of departure.
Modem systematic thought, on the other hand, took a militant stand both
against tradition as such and against the particular tradition of the medieval
state with its theologico-philosophical foundations. The theories of the modem
European state, needless to say, were essentially of a militant character. Applied
to the domain of law, especially to the notion of territorial or national law, this
meant that the new state created its own legal system, and that the concept of
sovereignty became the cornerstone of all legal thought. This concept, taken
as a legal postulate, proclaimed first of all that the sovereign territorial ruler
recognized no authority above his own, and in particular that he completely
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emancipated himself from the universal claims of Emperor and Pope.1 His claim
to complete independence rested upon an actual or asserted physical power of
defending this independence whenever and wherever necessary, as well as upon
his readiness to employ this power at his own discretion. Herein lay the con-
nection between modern voluntaristic notions of individualism and the modem
theory concerning the foundations of the state. But since, as a rule, only the
low and egoistical aspects of this individualism are identified with the sovereign,
and, at the same time, through the novel concept of sovereignty, act as a point
of departure for the whole legal system, the basic character of the modern state
itself is of necessity egoistical - one in which rule by force is a predominant
ingredient. Such a state is not declaratory of a moral order - that had been
the aim of the medieval concept of the body politic - but is arbitrary power
based on crude self-interest. Since the essence of the state is conceived of as the
assertion of its physical prowess, this power in a Machiavellian sense, which
makes its own interests the final standard or criterion of all action, strives above
all to assert itself in the name of "freedom" as against the outside world, and to
expand wherever possible in the name of "greatness."
This is not the place to investigate in detail the development of the modem
concept of the state or the particular philosophy of law which it engendered.
But it is necessary to hint at this development at least as far as natural law is
concerned. In this connection, it is decisive to note that the spirit of the En-
lightenment, of which the concept of sovereignty is only a political and legal
expression, degenerated in the course of the nineteenth century into a materi-
alistic and thereby more and more coarse way of thinking. As a result, legal
thinkers lost the inner power even to visualize the possibility of an archetypal
and morally binding ideal of justice above the positive legal order. With all its
deficiencies, the medieval concept of order did at least assume as well as recognize
as its logical presupposition a higher form of justice, namely, the notion of a
natural and divine right. The late nineteenth century in its materialistic and
voluntaristic tendencies, on the other hand, concurred with Rudolf von Jhering
that law is but the "child of power. ' 2
According to this new positivistic jurisprudence, the legislator, and he alone,
creates the law. Everything prior to legislative enactment is at best "custom,"
but never true law. Thus, law and right became wholly identified, and bare
"legality" takes the place of substantive justice as an ideal. The concept of a
politically organized society or state under the rule of law (Rechtsstaat) now
comes to signify merely an "organization in which the positive law is supreme
and binding upon the executive and judicial branches of government."
This approach to law was propounded during the time of the German
Empire (1871-1918). Advanced by a generation of influential jurists such as
Gerber, Laband, and G. Jellinek, it was congenial to the spirit of the age and,
hence, was hardly questioned. Rudolf Stammler, to be sure, in numerous publica-
1. See FREIHERR VON DER HEYDTE, DIE GEBURTSSTUNDE DES SOUVERXNEN STAATES
(1952); ERNST VON HIPPEL, 1 GESCHICHTE DER STAATSPHILOSOPHIE 337 ff. (2nd ed.,
1958).
2. ERNST VON HIPPEL, 2 GESCHICHTE DER STAATSPHILOSOPHIE 278 ff. (2nd ed., 1958);
DERRPECHTSOEDANKE IN DER GESCHICHTE (1955), and the bibliography mentioned there.
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tions, pointed out that it was well-nigh impossible to determine what the positive
law is in a given case without a valid theory of law and right which recognizes
the existence of rights prior to the state. But since the concept of a "just law"
which he proposed failed to establish any concrete limits to the sovereignty or
powers of the state, it was a concept with no practical or workable significance,
and, therefore, one which raised merely a theoretical problem of legal method.
The view which held that right and law are wholly identical - a view which
had already abolished the old theory of the right to resist actions of the state
- excluded the very possibility of any right against the law. Because of its
voluntaristic origin, the new concept of sovereignty in fact granted the legislator
unlimited powers. It was hoped, however - and this not without justification
in this period of "conservative decency" - that the legislator would not misuse
his legislative omnipotence to the detriment of the citizen. For this was a "liberal"
age in which the citizen was wont to secure for himself certain freedoms from
executive interference within an already sparse framework of laws.
Thus, natural law did not become a factor in the legal decisions of the
Imperial period. As a matter of fact, since healthy common sense and the
guarantee of freedom seemed embodied in the laws themselves, natural law and
natural rights were not considered necessary prerequisites of justice. Only
peripherally, in some isolated instances, can we find a vague reference to supra-
positivistic considerations of law and right. The Supreme Court of Germany
(Reichsgericht), for instance, held, in a decision having to do with the photo-
graphing of Bismarck's body against the declared wishes of his next of kin, that
it was "inconsistent with the natural feeling of right" that what had been
"secured through such an illegal action" should remain in the possession of the
securer. (December 28, 1899) 3 In a later decision, the loyalty which every
citizen owes his homeland is called a principle of the natural law.4 Furthermore,
there is an implicit transcendence of mere positivistic thinking in the theory of
"supralegal distress," which the court developed in its criminal decisions. During
this particular period natural law was also to be found, though on a subconscious
level, in the domain of statutory interpretation. The legislator himself made this
possible, if not necessary, especially when he set up such general standards of
"good faith" (Treu und Glauben) or "good morals" (gute Sitten), thus declaring
moral norms of behavior legally authoritative. To this day certain decisions are
based on the definition of the Supreme Court of the Empire, defining "good
morals" as "that which accords with the predominant moral sense of the people
- with the sense of decency and propriety entertained by all just and right-
thinking individuals." 5 This is a clear, though indirect, appeal to objective moral
criteria. For obviously experience alone will not divulge whether someone is
just and right-thinking; rather, previous knowledge of what constitutes justice
and right thought is required to define a just and right-thinking individual.
Natural law as such remained alien to the Weimar Constitution (1918-1933)
3. 45 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES REIcHSGERICHTS IN ZIvILSACHEN (hereafter cited as RGZ)
170 (1899).
4. 62 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES RmEICHSGERICHTS IN STRAFSACHEN (hereafter cited as
RGST) 67.
5. 48 RGZ 124 (1901); 80 RGZ 221 (1912).
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as well, although certain isolated principles of the natural law did enjoy the
status of constitutional provisions or guarantees. But the guarantees thus ac-
corded these general principles of justice were of limited value. The Constitution
itself could be changed at any time, and it was a regular practice to enact un-
constitutional laws. The President could, under certain circumstances, abrogate
basic constitutional rights by virtue of Art. 48 of the Constitution itself. But the
greatest obstacle to the recognition of natural law was the doctrine of positivism
which equated right and might to begin with and, hence, assigned to the legislator
full discretion as to the detailed content or provisions of the law, to the point
of injustice, indeed to the point of complete, high-handed arbitrariness. A decision
of the Supreme Court of the Reich of November 4, 1927, makes this fully clear:
"The legislator is absolutely autocratic, and bound by no limits save those he has
set for himself either in the constitution or in some other laws." 6 Two years later
the Supreme Court refused to consider whether a law was compatible with
supralegal standards.7 But that the refusal in the latter case was couched in
terms not of lack of jurisdiction, but of lack of power (Machtbefugnis), is
symptomatic of a complete surrender of legal thinking to the concepts of power
politics in this period.8 Every other organ of government, having its properly
defined and delimited area of jurisdiction, may not act arbitrarily. But the
legislature was presumed to be omnipotent; hence, the question of legislative
arbitrariness could not properly be raised.9
The Supreme Court of Germany, however, did not always sustain this stand-
point which is the logical consequence of the positivistic concept of law and its
doctrine of sovereignty. In some decisions the Court referred to "natural" or
"inalienable" rights,10 as well as to "limitations" imposed on the lawgiver.'1
Occasionally, the validity (Rechtmdssigkeit) of a certain statute was pointed out
as debatable (strittig) and left open.1 2
The divorce of legal concepts from the demands of reason and morality is
the direct result of the lawgiver's complete emancipation from any legal limita-
tions on his power. Thus, during the almost total inflation, the Federal Supreme
Court ruled that one paper mark was equivalent to one gold mark, since the
dictionary meaning of the term "mark" seemed the only relevant issue. This
decision enabled a mortgagee to pay off a substantial mortgage on his house
for the price of a pair of shoes; it declared him an honest man, at least in the
eyes of the law, and, at the same time, condoned his act of swindling the
mortgager out of his rightful claim. These are the fateful beginnings of a way
of thinking which, instead of determining legal concepts in accordance with
actual facts, subjects actual facts and their determination to the sway of meaning-
6. 118 RGZ 327 (1927).
7. 125 RGZ 279 (1929).
8. "It is not within the competence of the court to decide whether laws that have been
constitutionally enacted are compatible with good faith or good usage."
9. 102 RGZ 161 ff. (1921).
10. 62 RGST 65 ff. (1928).
11. 125 RGZ 422 (1929).
12. 107 RGZ 376 (1924). Compare and contrast with the theory of arbitrary right during
the Weimar period in Ernst von Hippel, Das Richterliche Priifungsrecht, 2 HANDBUCH DES
DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECUTs 547 ff. (ed. by Anschiitz and Thoma, 1932).
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less concepts - nominalistic procedures which enable present-day Soviet Russia
to term tyranny democracy, to treat lies as the truth and to call the unjust just.
The inadequacy of this purely legalistic standpoint became fully obvious
during the Third Reich (1933-1945), a regime which in fact it was instrumental
in creating or, at least, made possible in a juristic sense. The positivistic theory
which held law to be simply the expression of the sovereign will regardless of
the nature of that will, made supreme the will of the Fiihrer, and, by putting
it beyond the reviewing power of any court, made it the sole fountainhead of
law and right. Whenever the law may not be evaluated by the standards of
justice, because no higher (suprapositive) legal orders are recognized, the
legality of a disposition depends entirely on its total subjection to an arbitrary
and, hence, evil will. According to an order issued in 1936 by the so-called
Reichsrechtsfiihrer (Commissar of Justice), this position, into which the adherents
of positivism had maneuvered themselves and the whole community as well, is
epitomized as follows: "A decision of the Fiihrer in the express form of a law
or decree may not be scrutinized by a judge. In addition, the judge is bound
by any other decisions of the Fiihrer, provided that they are clearly intended to
declare law." Thus the will of the Fiihrer and everything he proclaimed arbi-
trarily, came to be binding on the courts. The only debatable point was the
form in which this will had been expressed. But this does not furnish any guar-
antee of lawfulness: the decisive criterion was simply the "unambiguous intention
to determine law."
II. THE BONN CONSTITUTION
The disastrous results of a jurisprudence which ignored the moral element
in the law could not be missed by the majority of jurists after the collapse of
the Third Reich. Especially influential was the about-face of Gustav Radbruch
- criminal lawyer, philosopher of law, and Minister of Justice during the Weimar
Republic - who, because of his sincerity and the literary elegance of his writings,
was one of the best-known jurists in Germany. The Third Reich had dismissed
him and sentenced him to silence. Now, in an essay entitled "Rechtsphilosophische
Besinnung"13 (Reappraisal of Legal Philosophy) he came forward to renounce
and denounce positivism - a Pauline conversion, for he himself had previously
been among the defenders of positivist views - in these terms:
For the soldier an order is an order; for the jurist, the law is the law. But
the soldier's duty to obey an order is at an end if he knows that the order
will result in a crime. But the jurist, since the last natural law men in his
profession died off a hundred years or so ago, has known no such exception
and no such excuse for the citizen's not submitting to the law. The law is
valid simply because it is the law; and it is law if it has the power to assert
itself under ordinary conditions. Such an attitude towards the law and its
validity [i.e., positivism] rendered both lawyers and people impotent in the
fact of even the most capricious, criminal, or cruel of laws. Ultimately, this
view that only where there is power is there law [Recht] is nothing but an
affirmation that might makes right [Recht]. [Actually] law [Recht] is the
quest for justice . . . if certain laws [Gesetze] deliberately deny this quest for
13. Reprinted in the RHEIN-NECKAR ZErTUNo of September 12, 1945, and in GuSTAV
RADBRUCH, DER MENScH IM RECHT 105 ff. (1957).
ERNST VON HIPPEL
justice (for example, by arbitrarily granting or denying men their human
rights) they are null and void; the-people are not to obey them, and jurists
must find the courage to brand them unlawful [ihnen den Rechtscharakter
absprechen].
This appeal of Radbruch's is, of course, particularly addressed to the judiciary.
For them it takes on especial significance, since the Bonn Constitution of May
23, 1949, has singled out the judges to be the protectors of the higher legal
orders against the rules of mere positive law. Insofar as these higher principles
are of divine origin, they are referred to only indirectly, in the passage of the
Preamble which directs the attention of the legislator to his "responsibility before
God"-a passage which, unless the basic idea of the Constitution is a lie or a
blasphemy, means a recognition of the whole Christian tradition. On the other
hand, the reference to natural law as a body of legally binding suprapositive
principles is unmistakable when the constitution regulates the content of the
positive law by acknowledging "inviolable and inalienable rights of man" which
the legislator must respect at all times. Also, in Art. 1, "all public authority"
(alle staatliche Gewalt) is enjoined always to respect and safeguard the "un-
impeachable" dignity of man: the state is thus declared to exist for the sake of
the higher life of man. Never may it treat man as a mere building block in its
structure of egoistical power -a thing which positivism had not only permitted
but actually taken as one of its logical presuppositions.
1. The Third Reich: A Rule of Unjust Law.-Let us attempt to analyze
and systematize certain decisions which shed some light on the "legal order" of
the Third Reich. We shall begin with those decisions which deny that the
Third Reich had a "rule of law" in the proper sense of the term, or which de-
clared some of its laws invalid because of their particular content. Behind these
decisions is the insight, more or less distinct, that there may be a "rule of unjust
law." Such a rule can be "in force" and thus be "legally binding" in a positivistic
sense, and yet lack the true character of law: for evil can only constrain - it
cannot obligate.
Thus, the appellate court (Oberlandesgericht) at Frankfurt in a decision
of August 12, 1947, had to pass on the contention of certain physicians who had
participated in "experimental killings," that they were not conscious of breaking
the law (Rechtswidrigkeit) since their actions had been sanctioned, in fact de-
sired, by the laws of the Third Reich. The court declared:
Such a way of thinking would not do justice to the true character of the
National Socialist "law." Law must be defined as an ordinance or precept
devised in the service of justice [citing Radbruch]. Whenever the conflict
between an enacted law and true justice reaches unendurable proportions,
the enacted law must yield to justice, and be considered a "lawless law
[unrichtiges Recht]." An accused may not justify his conduct by appealing
to an existing law if this law offended against certain self-evident precepts
of the natural law. That is the situation here.1 4
As early as 1945 a decision of the lower court (Amtsgericht) in Wiesbaden
held: "The laws which declared that the property of Jews had become forfeited
14. 2 SUDDEUTSCHE JURISTEN ZEITSCHRIFT (hereafter cited as SJZ) 521 ff. (1947).
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to the state" were "incompatible with natural law," and, therefore, "void at the
very time of their enactment." 1 5 The Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof) like-
wise reached the conclusion that an order of Hitler's issued shortly before the
end of the war which made it incumbent upon every bearer of arms to shoot
deserters without benefit of trial, was not binding since it offended "to an in-
tolerable degree" against "the law of nations and of nature."1 6
In a decision of February 8, 1952, the same court addressed itself to the ques-
tion "whether laws and ordinances can be considered 'law,' in the true sense
of the term, if their content offends against the claims of the natural law or against
the generally valid rules of conduct in the Christian Western tradition." 1 7
Finally, as though in summation, a decision of the same court of February
12, 1952, points to the general invalidity of the laws of the Nazi regime:
Those in power during the Third Reich issued numerous regulations which
claimed to be "lawful" and establish "law." However, these regulations lacked
the quality of laws because they violated those basic principles which are
independent of the recognition of governments and stronger than any en-
actment by the government. Regulations issued by the government which do
not even attempt to bring about true justice do not create law; and actions
which conform to them remain wrong.1S
2. The Rejection of Legal Positivism.-An explicit rejection of legal posi-
tivism with its confounding of lawfulness and legality can be found in a decision
of the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) of October 23,
1951:19
Blind adherence to the principle that the original framer of the Constitution
may arrange everything to suit himself would be tantamount to a relapse
into legal positivism, a way of thinking that jurists have long since abandoned,
both in theory and in practice. It is not necessarily true that the original
framer of the Constitution, in the very nature of things, will never overstep
the absolute bounds of justice.
The same idea also underlies a per curiam opinion of the Bundesgerichtshof which
rejects the positivistic theory of sovereignty:20
The opposite view, advanced especially by Apelt, cannot be maintained.
This view holds that the framer of the Constitution is "autonomous" in
establishing a "system of values." Such a position completely denies the
existence of any higher compelling standard of law and justice above the legis-
lator. It would acknowledge as "rightful" [rechtmiissig] a written constitution
15. 1 SJZ 36 (1946).
16. 3 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFS IN ZIVILSACHEN (hereafter cited as
BGHZ) 106 (1951).
17. 5 BGHZ 97 (1952).
18. ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESOERICHTSHOFS IN STRAFSACHEN (hereafter cited as
BGHST) 177 (1952).
19. 1 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS (hereafter cited as BVG)
18 ff. (1952).
20. 11 BGHZ, Appendix 34 ff. (1953).
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devised to legalize a reign of arbitrary force and thus declare it binding upon
the courts. Bachoff rightly points out that such a result would be absolutely
unacceptable to the German sense of justice, where the memory of "legalized
wrong" [gesetzliches Unrecht] is still fresh.
Along with positivism itself, the positivistic method of statutory interpreta-
tion - a combination of dogmatic or empirical points of departure with what
is taken for logical procedure - is rejected. A trial court (Schwurgericht) in
Cologne declared in a case of "mercy-killing": "In the realm of natural law the
intellect is supreme, and proper solutions are reached, not by following signposts,
but by following a sense of moral propriety, guided by human conscience."2
1
In this connection, another court expressly acknowledged the individual's right
to resist a regime of "legalized wrong." 22
3. Acknowledgment of Suprapositive Norms and Standards.-The decisions
mentioned above find their justification in the acknowledgment of suprapositive
principles at the basis of positive law. Usually these principles are referred to
as "natural law," but other terms, such as the "moral law," the "moral order,"
"material justice," "idea of right and justice [Rechtsidee]," or "general order
of moral values," are used.
In particular, during the interregnum between the collapse of the Nazi
regime and the founding of the new Federal Republic, the courts in their decisions
were often forced to fall back on natural law.2 3 Not the least important of these
decisions dealt with so-called "euthanasia judgments," that is, with those acts
of planned murder of "incurably" sick persons during the Third Reich by an
order of Hitler's to the Reichsleiter Bouhler and Dr. Brandt. Also the superior
court (Landgericht) at Bonn, in a judgment of October 20, 1947,24 declared
the right to freedom of movement as derivative from natural law. And in a
decision of July 27, 1949, the Oberlandesgericht at Bamberg found that the
Heimtiickegesetz was grossly unfair, but did not violate natural law, since it
demanded only an omission, namely silence.2 5
After the adoption of the Bonn Constitution (Grundgesetz, or "fundamental
law"), and the postwar state constitutions, the courts made it clear that their
use of suprapositive norms was not to be confined to cases in which the official
acts of the Third Reich were in question. The Schwurgericht at Cologne, in the
case already referred to, said: "Above positive law there is a higher unwritten
law. A law enacted by man can make no claim to validity if it runs counter to
the natural law." 2 6 Similarly, the Bavarian Constitutional Court (Verfassungs-
21. Decision of October 24, 1951, reprinted in 2 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIPT
(hereafter cited as NJW) 358 (1952).
22. BVG, reported in 56 NJW 1393 (1956); and BGH, reported in 6 NJZ 1369 (1953).
23. Amtsgericht Wiesbaden, decision of November 13, 1945, reported in 1 SJZ 36 (1946);
Kammergericht, decision of August 24, 1946, 2 DEUTscHE RECHTSZEITSCHRIFT (here-
after cited as DRZ) 198 ff. (1947); Oberlandesgericht Saarbriicken, decision of May 21,
1947, 2 DRZ 341 ff. (1947); Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt, decision of August 12, 1947,
2 SJZ 621 ff. (1947); Landgericht K6ln, decision of March 5, 1949, 3 MONATSCHRIFT FUR
DEUTSCHES REcHT (hereafter cited as MDR) 370 ff. (1949).
24. 2 MDR 153 (1948).
25. 5 DRZ 302 (1950).
26. 5 NJW 358 (1952).
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gerichtshof) referred to private property as a right which precedes the state or
the legal order.27
Since these principles precede both the state as such and positive law as
such, it follows that the maker of the constitution is himself bound by them.
Thus, the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) expressly de-
clared that a constituent assembly is "bound by the suprapositive principles of
justice which underlie all written law." 28 And the Bavarian Constitutional Court
(Verfassungsgerichtshof), in a decision of June 10, 1949, held:
A provision is not necessarily valid simply by virtue of being embodied in
the Constitution itself. There are constituent principles so basic, so elementary,
so very much the expression of a justice which every constitution must pre-
suppose, that they are binding even upon the author of the constitution.
Those constitutional provisions which go against these principles may actually
be held invalid.2
9
Some decisions refer to "justice" rather than to "natural law," and sometimes
both concepts are used simultaneously. Thus, the decision just quoted refers
in one place to "natural rights belonging to all human beings, which rights
precede positive law and limit the power of the state," and in another place
demands of the legislator a "guiding orientation toward the ideal of justice."
The Schwurgericht at Cologne puts the two concepts into one sentence: "For
reasons of a higher justice founded on natural law.... "30
Another decision making reference to an "ideal of justice" as a guiding
principle of the positive law is that of the first senate of the Federal Constitutional
Court of December 18, 1953, which mentions "material justice" as contrasted
with "legal certainty" and holds: "A provision of a constitution can be invalid
if it disregards to an intolerable degree those postulates of justice which belong
to the basic determining principle of the constitution itself."3 1 Finally, "even
the application of individual statutes," the court of last instance in the British
Zone of Occupation (Oberster Gerichtshof fiir die Britische Zone, or OGHST)
ruled, always requires "an awareness of the fundamental principles of justice." 32
Other decisions, instead of appealing to "natural law," refer to the "moral
law" or to the "dictates of morality." Thus the Federal Supreme Court
(Bundesgerichtshof) in a decision of February 17, 1954, declared: "The true
compelling force of the law consists precisely in its correspondence with the
dictates of the moral law." 33 In this fashion monogamy was declared to be in
accord with the moral order.3 4 And the Schwurgericht at Cologne announced
27. 2 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BAYRISCHEN VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSHOFS, Neue Folge
(II), no. 1, p. 2 (1949) (hereafter cited as BAYR. VGH).
28. Decision of October 23, 1951, 1 BAYR. VGH 17 (1952).
29. 2 BAYR. VGH, Neue Folge (II), no. 5, p. 45 (1949). Accord: decision of April 25,
1950, 3 BAYR. VGH, Neue Folge (II), no. 6, p. 29 (1950).
30. 5 NJW 358 (1952).
31. 3 BVG 225 (1953).
32. 2 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES OBERSTEN GERICHTSHOFS FUR DIE BRITISCHE ZONE IN
STRAFSACHEN (hereafter cited as OGHST) 269 ff. (1950).
33. BGH, reported in 9 JURISTENZEITUNG (hereafter cited as JZ) 509 (1954).
34. Ibid.
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that "[t]he question whether an act is right or wrong, that is, whether the actor
has made an error in judgment and whether or not his conduct is blameworthy -
all these questions can be answered only on the basis of an unwritten law, the
moral law."
3 5
In the decision of the Bundesgerichtshof of February 17, 1954 (see footnote
33), which dealt with the question of whether acts of unchastity are possible
between affianced people, the moral law appears to be substantially linked with
an objective moral order or order of moral values:
The precepts of the moral law derive their validity from themselves. Their
absolute compelling nature not only rests upon a given order of moral values
which simply must be accepted, but is founded on a set of moral imperatives
which regulate human communal life. These precepts remain in force
whether or not they are obeyed by those to whom they are addressed, or
even whether or not they are generally accepted. Their content and meaning
does not change simply because opinions about what is right or wrong may
vary.
The Supreme Court (Oberste Landesgericht) of Bavaria, in an opinion of
November 15, 1950, defined the concept of "legal order" in such a way that
it includes the "entirety of all the norms of written and unwritten law," including
the suprapositive concepts of law and right.36
4. The Authority of Social or Cultural Standards.-In a number of de-
cisions the issue was not so much the binding force of objective norms as such,
as that of the special content given these norms by particular social or cultural
groups. As regards this problem, the Federal Supreme Court held:
Commands issued by the sovereign which do not even aim at bringing about
justice . . . but which flagrantly ignore the rights and the dignity of the
human personality as they have been observed by all civilized peoples, do not
create law. Any act conforming to such commands is unjust and wrong.
[Italics added.]3
7
And in another decision:
However wide the latitude we may allow to the state in deciding what shall
be right and wrong, it still is not, and cannot be, unlimited: in the moral
awareness of all civilized peoples there is, in spite of all the individual dif-
ferences we may find on specific points of law, a certain core of law and
justice which may not be violated by any statute or other act of the
authorities.38
A third decision of the same court refers to a "general intuitive feeling for what
is just," to an "ordre publique" as well as to "convictions concerning what is
35. 5 NJW 359 (1952).
36. 1 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BAYRISCHEN OBERSTEN LANDESGERICHTS IN STRAFSACHEN
n. 41 (1950).
37. 2 BGHST 177 (1952). See also 2 OGHST 272 (1950).
38. Decision of Jan. 29, 1952, 2 BGHST 237 (1952).
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right among all civilized nations."3 9 Finally, the Criminal Senate of the same
court, on February 12, 1952, points to the "historical tradition and practice of
all civilized peoples" as well as to their "moral conviction of what is just."
Except for the whole of humanity itself, which finds its expression in the
concept of natural law, the most comprehensive point of practical moral reference
for a higher law and justice seems to be the notion of a single Christendom. In
a way the concept of Christendom proves to be superior, or at least supplementary,
to that of the natural law, because here the religious ideal takes its place beside
the ideal of justice. This is illustrated in a decision of the Federal Supreme Court
of February 8, 1952, which referred to "generally valid moral laws held in
common by the Christian civilization of the West." Similarly, a decision of the
same court of March 10, 1954, declared that "[e]very attempt at suicide-
with possible exceptions in extreme cases - is condemned by the moral law,
because no one may highhandedly dispose of his own life and inflict death upon
himself" - a position tenable only from the standpoint of Christianity, since
the Stoics, for example, considered suicide as an expression of personal freedom.
Finally, in a decision already mentioned rendered by the appellate court
(Oberlandesgericht) at Bamberg of July 27, 1949, the view is advanced that
something can be forbidden simply by "divine law."
In addition to these criteria, cultural standards prevailing within the par-
ticular society are also cited as carrying moral weight. The Federal Supreme
Court based the right of a man to give his name to his wife upon the "still pre-
dominant feeling in all walks of life, among people of both sexes" that the man
represents the family to the outside world, and that "in the natural division of
labor within marriage the family is known and referred to by the name of
the male." 40 In an opinion of the Oberlandesgericht at Celle4 l there is reference
to the "unspoiled views of the peasant population," and to "ancient well-founded
tradition inherited from time immemorial." It will be noted here that the
subjectivity which inheres in any reference to someone's "views" is modified
by the objectivity implied in the adjective "unspoiled." This excludes the pos-
sibility of interpreting the quoted language as calling for a purely sociological
and, hence, value-free criterion. Seen in this light, there is great significance
in the opinion of the Federal Supreme Court4 2 which prohibits the judge from
deferring to the "changing opinions and customs of fluid social groupings,"
inasmuch as it is not always certain "whether [these opinions] are based upon
any truly moral conviction, or just upon a kind of moral indifference, or perhaps
upon a sense of the wrongness and 'illegality' of a concrete situation
[Ordnungswidrigkeit des Geschehen]." Otherwise one would end up in a
"meaningless and destructive relativism which knows of no other standard or
guide than the social realities and, hence, remains without any moral values
or value judgments."
39. 5 BGHZ 97 (1952).
40. 5 BGHZ 97 (1952).
41. 9 NJW 1158 (1956).
42. BGH, reported in 9 JZ 509 (1954).
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5. The Embodiment of Suprapositive Standards in Positive Law.-As a
further recognition of suprapositive principles of law and justice, the Bonn Con-
stitution maintains that these principles operate both as positive, practical, and
concrete criteria or norms of law and, as regards their compelling validity, as
suprapositive standards of right and justice. Accordingly, the Federal Constitu-
tional Court declared with respect to the principle that "all men are equal before
the law," that this principle was "so much a part of our basic legal and con-
stitutional order" that "one would have to refer back to this suprapositive
principle itself, if the principle of equality had not expressly been written into
the Constitution in Article 3."43 Recognizing the "equality clause" as a part of
the written or positive law, the court considers it at the same time as emanating
from the idea of right and justice itself. 44 Similarly the Federal Supreme Court
refers to the "strictly supralegal" character of Article 3 of the Bonn Constitution.4 5
6. Freedom of the Person as a Legal Standard.-Being primarily related
to the human person, the principle of equality before the law recognizes the
person as a limit as well as a norm for all legislation. Thus the concept of sub-
stantial individual freedom is strengthened by the concept of restraint imposed
on all arbitrary acts by those currently in power. Legislative caprice is limited
not only by objective, universally valid standards, but also by the (subjective)
human person and his moral freedom. Hence, all those principles of law have
suprapositive meaning which grant a freedom so essential to the true human
nature that to curtail it would be violative of man's very moral substance. This
being so, the provisions of the Bonn Constitution concerning human freedom are
not only significant for positive law, but are actual expressions of the suprapositive
constitutional principles of the rule of law itself. Also, attention should be called
here-once again to the "dignity of man," a paramount legal significance which
expresses, as it were, the worth of the human person as an end in himself. The
"elementary basic rights," 46 according to the Bavarian Constitutional Court con-
stitute an "insurmountable barrier" to arbitrary caprice on the part of the
sovereign. For they are the "immediate expression of the human personality" 47
as well as of its worth and dignity.
4 8
Among the inalienable claims that a man as such has upon the law and the
legal order is that claim to a proper judicial procedure in cases where his life
is at stake.4 9 But such a procedure can be afforded him only where the courts
enjoy fullest freedom in ascertaining the truth in order to do justice, that is, where
the courts are not mere executors of commands originating outside the law.
There must be a procedure calculated to "ascertain the truth," and the findings
must be made by judges "independent of any command from above," and, hence,
subject only to the dictates of their free and untrammelled consciences as jurists.50
43. 1 BVG 233 (1952).
44. 4 BVG 144 ff. (1956).
45. 11 BGHZ 34 ff. (1954).
46. 3 BAYR. VGH II, no. 14, p. 167 (1950).
47. 3 BAYR. VGH II, no. 6, p. 48 (1950).
48. 2 BGHST 177 (1952); 2 OGHST 2, 27 (1950).
49. 1 VERWALTUNOSRECHTSSPRECHUNG 373 (1949).
50. 2 BGHST 175 (1952).
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7. Conclusion.-We have seen, then, at least in outline, the impressive evi-
dence of the vital role the natural law is playing in the current decisions of the
courts of the German Federal Republic. It cannot be denied, however, that even
after 1945 a number of appellate courts, particularly in northern Germany, have
clung to legal positivism.51 And there always remains the danger that after a
certain state of order has been reached, the idea of a suprapositive law and
justice may again be abandoned. For although it may be understandable and, in
fact, in the interest of the cause, that the idea of natural law be called upon only
when the necessity arises, the natural law must continue to remain constantly
alive as an appeal to man's moral conscience. Viewed in this manner, Germany
is already on the path back to legal positivism when the Federal Constitutional
Court maintains that "legal certainty" is "an essential element of any sovereign
legal order" 5 2 which "seeks to realize true postulates of justice." For legal
certainty is not part of the idea of a truly just law; it is an aspect of the legal
order and, hence, can be meaningful only if what it insures is justice and not
injustice.
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(Translated by HENI WENKART)
51. Oberlandesgericht Kiel, reported in 2 SJZ 323 ff. (1947); Landgericht Hildesheim,
reported in 3 SJZ 143 (1948); Oberlandesgericht [OLG] Hamburg, reported in 3 SJZ 37
(1948); OLG Hamburg, reported in 3 VERSICHERUNGSRECHT 112 (1952); Oberlandes-
gericht Diisseldorf, reported in 3 NJW 959 (1950).
2. 3 1VG 237 (1954),
